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The Historical Lessons and Intellectual Rigour o f 
Admiral Sir Herbert William Richmond
Commander Bruce McLennan, RNZN
there is no doubt that we are the most appalling amateurs who ever tried to conduct a war'
Admiral H.W. Richmond
Introduction
Admiral Sir Herbert William Richmond (1871-1946) is remembered as a naval officer, an historian, 
and an intellectual. He was nurtured during an era when the Royal Navy was assimilating the 
advent o f ‘mechanisation’, and forming its doctrine in the artificial conditions o f peace. This 
was the Dreadnought era: the era o f the ‘materialist’ school o f strategic thought when the Royal 
Navy was driven by the arguments o f the technical rationalists, to the neglect o f the historical 
strategists. Richmond led the intellectual counter— the ‘historical’ school o f strategic thought—  
and while never producing an overall theory o f naval strategy, he did produce an overall reality 
on the application o f the naval instrument.
Admiral Richmond’s first book, The Navy in the War o f  1739-1748, published in 1920, won him 
the Royal United Service Institution’s Chesney Gold Medal.2 His most successful book Statesman 
and Sea Power, published in 1946, firmly established him as a classical theorist o f the standing 
o f Colomb, Mahan and Corbett. Statesman and Sea Power is a sweeping analysis o f British foreign 
policy from Elizabeth 1 to the end o f the Second World War in which Richmond examines ‘the inter­
relationships o f political and military strategy, and the connections between Britain’s developing 
overseas influence and the utilisation o f her maritime strengths’.3 It was his teachings on the 
abiding realities o f ‘naval power’. It was also the mature thoughts o f a man at the end o f a long 
and exasperated life: one o f constant frustration and disenchantment with the lack o f intellectual 
rigour applied to the policies o f his superiors. Still, even with these frustrations, Richmond’s life 
was incredibly rich and successful both as a naval officer and as a professional historian.
But there is a lot more to Herbert Richmond than just these two books— he was a prolific writer 
o f books, historical documents, journal articles, newspaper articles, and pamphlets.4 ‘Richmond 
was a unique phenomenon in the Victorian-Edwardian Navy— a professionally competent and 
successful officer who was also an intellectual. ...a highly censorious, ambitious, and impatient 
young captain o f the Dreadnought era .. .an officer eminently capable o f clear thinking.. .a decided 
flair for the use o f persuasive logic; a man who by virtue o f an outstanding intellect, a restless 
and uncompromising personality, and the depth o f his grasp o f historical realities became the 
fountainhead o f British naval thought in the twentieth century. Above all, Richmond worked to 
cure the intellectual retardation, which characterised the pre-1914 Royal Navy and its myopic 
approach to policy development in the years following.’5
He led the ‘intellectual revolution’ within the Royal Navy from 1912, with the founding o f the 
Naval Society and the publishing o f the Naval Review, and he brought about major changes 
in naval strategic thought, policy and organisation that have endured the ‘gauntlet o f robust
debate’ over time. Heretical by his very nature, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond gave us our 
understanding o f matters ‘naval’ at the dawn o f the 20th century— not a doctrine, but a 
methodology o f higher education, staff work, planning and objectives.
The aim o f this article is to analyse Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond— the man, his environment, 
and his teachings— in order to explain his contribution to our understanding o f naval strategy 
at a time when we are also assimilating the advent o f new technology— ‘informatisation — and 
forming future combat doctrine in the artificial conditions o f peace.
The man
wide-minded and high-minded ... a strong character, possessing power o f thought and power
o f expression, unique in having flown his flag as Commander-in-Chief, a figure in Cambridge, as
Admiral, and Master o f Downing College...
Captain Alfred Dewar 19476
Herbert Richmond entered the Royal Navy in 1885. His first ship was HMS Nelson, flagship 
on the Australian Station. From his youth he was regarded as ‘an officer o f character and 
outstanding talent’.7 Richmond also inherited a talent for drawing that led him towards the 
hydrographic specialisation and service in HMS Stork, serving in the Mediterranean, and later 
in HMS Active. In 1894 he was appointed to the shore establishment HMS Vernon to qualify 
as Torpedo Lieutenant, remaining there on the staff until 1897. As a Torpedo Lieutenant he 
served in HM Ships Empress o f  India, Ramillies, Canopus and Majestic. He was promoted to 
Commander in 1903 and served in HMS Crescent, the flagship o f Rear Admiral John Durnford, 
before being transferred to the Admiralty in 1906. Admiral Sir John Fisher, who had become the 
First Sea Lord in 1904, was drawn by Richmond’s energy and intellect— ‘out and away without 
precedent [one of] the most able men in the Navy.’8 In 1908 he was promoted to Captain and 
appointed in command o f the new battleship HMS Dreadnought, as the flag captain to Vice 
Admiral Sir William May.
After HMS Dreadnought, Richmond was appointed in command o f the cruisers HM Ships Furious 
and, later, Vindictive. This was the time when Sir Julian Corbett was lecturing on naval history at 
the War College and Richmond found time to study the War o f the Austrian Succession— later 
published as The Navy in the War o f  1739-1748. In 1912 Captain Richmond started the idea 
o f the Naval Review to encourage the exchange o f ‘sea-military knowledge’, and gained the 
support o f Winston Churchill, then the First Lord, Admiral Prince Louis o f Battenberg, then 
the First Sea Lord, and asked Admiral William Henderson to be the first honorary editor. Also 
that year, his proposed Naval War Staff finally came into being and Richmond was appointed 
as Assistant Director o f Operations, remaining at the Admiralty until Lord Fisher’s sudden 
resignation in May 1915. Shunted aside after challenging the wisdom o f the Gallipoli campaign, 
he was expelled to act as liaison officer in Italy to the Duke o f Abruzzi. When Admiral Sir 
David Beatty was appointed as Commander-in-Chief o f the Grand Fleet in 1917, Richmond 
regained political favour and was given command o f the battleship HMS Conqueror. Thence he 
came to the Naval Staff in 1918 as Director Training Division and embarked on his campaign 
to place the education o f naval officers on wider and firmer foundations. His views on training, in
particular public school recruitment, did not gain favour and he was sent back to the Grand 
Fleet in command o f the elderly battleship HMS Erin: to be removed out o f sight, ‘ ...both his 
terms o f service in the Admiralty ended in abrupt dismissal; ... The causes lie, 1 think, partly 
in the defect o f intolerance ... which probably appeared in speech and attitude rather than 
on paper, but more in the fact that in power o f thought, and in outlook towards such matters 
as staff work and education, he was many years ahead o f his contemporaries.’9
In 1920, Richmond was promoted to flag rank, and appointed to Greenwich in charge o f the 
Senior Officer’s War Course. This developed into his appointment from 1923 to 1925 as the 
Commander-in-Chief, East Indies. He was promoted to Vice Admiral in 1925, and knighted 
in 1926. In the East Indies he did much to focus attention on the needs o f the navy in India, 
publishing The Navy in India, 1763-83 .10 In 1927 he became Commandant o f the newly instituted 
Imperial Defence College— the first real attempt to bring together senior officers o f all three 
Services to address the coordination o f war effort. However, Admiral Beatty’s retirement in 
1927 removed his chief supporter, and although promoted to full Admiral in 1929, the final 
breach with the Admiralty came over his open advocacy o f the small capital ship instead o f 
building up to the limit o f 35,000 tons agreed at the 1921 Washington Conference.
Herbert Richmond retired from the Royal Navy in 1931. In 1934 he succeeded Dr Holland Rose 
as Vere-Harmsworth Professor o f Naval History at Cambridge, and later was elected to the 
Mastership o f Downing College— a position he held until his death in December 1946.
‘We shall not often see his like again. A first-class seaman, a brilliant technical officer... a 
deeply-read scholar, a clear thinker and an able debater...’"  ‘Looking back today I feel that it 
was not Richmond’s profound knowledge o f naval history, nor his great literary gifts, nor his 
power o f piercing analysis o f intractable problems that marked him as a most unusual man. 
Rather does his mental incorruptibility provide the key to his undoubted distinction.’12
His environment
the tradition o f 100 years o f peace in which war was forgotten.
Admiral Richmond 27 August 191713
To understand Richmond’s environment during his career with the Royal Navy is to first 
understand Admiral Sir John Fisher’s term as the First Sea Lord o f the Admiralty. Both as a 
technocrat and as a power broker, Admiral Fisher dominated the Royal Navy’s development 
through the ‘mechanisation’ revolution at the turn o f the century. However, although Admiral 
Fisher was clever— even a genius— it would be wrong to think o f him as an original thinker 
o f outstanding ability. Fisher was the ultimate ‘rationalist’ and he had tremendous personal 
energy. He had the ability to detect new ideas and to manipulate the game o f administrative 
and political power astutely enough to ensure that these ideas were brought to fruition. ‘This 
is what distinguished Fisher from his contemporaries: that he was able to see the naval service 
and its problems [as a] whole and, within a short space o f time, to translate theoretical ideas 
into practical policy. That he was often both ruthless and wrong is obvious. That he dominated 
the British naval scene between 1900-1914 is equally clear.’14
The most obvious manifestation o f Admiral Fisher’s influence occurred in 1906 when Britain 
launched HMS Dreadnought. Previously, British battleships built under the Naval Defence Act 
o f 1889 typically displaced about 13,000 tons, carried four 12-inch guns in two large turrets, 
and were armed with as many as ten 6-inch and 4-inch guns as secondary batteries. The largest 
guns could hit a target 6,000 yards distant, or about six times further than the range o f the 
then torpedoes. HMS Dreadnought was the first o f the ‘all big-gun ships’. She was armed with 
ten 12-inch guns in five turrets. With improved ‘spotting’ HMS Dreadnought could lay down 
an accurate fire to 13,000 yards and overwhelm any conventional battleship before it could 
get within range to reply. HMS Dreadnought also had steam-turbine engines in place o f piston- 
driven engines, the first large warship so equipped. She burned a combination o f oil and coal, 
and used four screws instead o f two. Despite her 11 inches o f armour at belt-line and a total 
displacement o f 17,800 tons, she reached a speed o f 21.5 knots on trials; six knots faster than 
existing battleships^ In summary, the advent o f HMS Dreadnought made all previous battleships 
obsolete. In her day, she was the apex o f mechanisation and the revolution in technology. She 
became the foundation and showcase o f the ‘materialist’ school o f strategic thought.
This revolution in technology and preoccupation with naval strength, which, since the mid 
19th century, had kept naval thinkers’ minds occupied almost exclusively with questions o f 
ship design and weapons performance, was undoubtedly the main reason for the Grand Fleet’s 
numerical superiority in September 1914. However, its absolutism was also the basis o f serious 
defects. ‘The brain o f Jupiter had indeed produced an Athene fully armed ... It was no one’s 
business to be sure that the poor lady could ever use her spear.’15 ‘ .. .Britain saw a tremendous 
technical creature rear itself up without it being generally realized that the monster’s brain 
was not commensurate with its body.’16 Or as Andrew Gordon describes it ‘ ...while the Royal 
Navy was undergoing its fifty year conversion from oak and canvas to steel and turbines, its 
once-clear, empiricist understanding o f “product” was pilfered from the lay-apart store by the 
vested interest o f “process” ...’ .17
‘Thus prior to 1914, naval thinkers and reformers who worked to encourage a broader, more 
intellectual approach to problems o f tactics, strategy, and national policy were dealing with a 
service whose recent history and whose current sense o f urgency were geared to a materialist 
ethic.’18 The Royal Navy had gravitated towards the ‘material’ and the ‘mechanical’ to the 
utter neglect o f the ‘military’ and the ‘strategic’.19 Of the naval officers who took issue with 
this preoccupation and the absolutism o f the ‘materialist’ school, Richmond appeared to be 
the most persistent, and probably the most formidably intelligent. Richmond ‘recoiled at the 
extremism o f futuristic prognostications— o f which there were plenty... Basically, he believed 
it was imprudent to bank on prescience. Wisdom lay in imaginative expectation disciplined 
by recollection o f historical patterns— not just static patterns, but dynamic patterns too, in 
which not only weapons technology but other sorts o f conditions change.’20
His teachings
The Navy ‘ is first, the statesman’s tool, and second, the warrior’s weapon. Sea power and naval
strength are not always synonymous terms.’
Captain W.V. Pratt, USN July 192321
Admiral Richmond was the ultimate maritime strategic iconoclast. His alleged heresies 
included challenging World War One British naval strategy and its cherished belief in ‘fleet 
concentration’, ‘decisive battle’ and the materialistic emphasis o f the ‘big gun ship’. He was 
an averred supporter o f the convoy system and the necessity to protect trade. He offered 
support for tri-Service joint command arrangements, emphasised the need for operational 
planning staff, stressed that maritime power on its own is not an end in itself, addressed 
the qualitative and quantitative aspects o f  force structure, and promoted the idea o f 
advancing the higher education o f professional naval officers.
His strategic conviction, in 1912, centred on his opposition to the idea that destroying 
the enemy’s battle fleet was the ultimate object o f  naval strategy. He did not deny its 
efficacy, and he agreed that if the enemy formed such a fleet then the superior navy should 
‘disable’ the enemy’s concentration— render it ‘unable to oppose’ . However, it was not 
necessary to destroy it. He argued that the selective positioning o f a strong countering 
force, and reducing the scope o f harmful action by seizing the enemy’s outlying bases, 
would achieve the same ends.
Through this argument he gave us the idea o f strategic breadth. ‘The ultimate aim o f sea 
power [Richmond contends]... was control o f the sea; and that control could be achieved 
only if all the constituent elements o f strength at sea were present. Sea power, in other 
words, is not naval strength, as our modern interpreters suppose, but naval strength is 
one, and certainly the most important, o f  the constituents o f that larger thing, Sea Power. 
... If we are to consider what constitutes sea power we must ... decide what ultimate 
end sea power exists to attain.’22 And ‘Command o f the sea is only useful for the end it 
serves.’23 ‘ ...control o f the sea is not an end in itself. It ... is a means to an end.’24
It was therefore a question o f emphasis, and too much emphasis on the destruction o f 
the enemy’s Battle Fleet led to the situation where, by 1915, Britain had ‘now a more 
complete command o f the sea ... than we have possessed in any previous maritime war, 
and yet we are making less o f its special advantage than we ever did.’25 The alarming 
losses o f mercantile shipping to German submarine attacks post-February 1917, and 
the Grand Fleet’s reluctance to release 100 o f its destroyers for convoy duties was the 
case in point. While the ‘materialist’ school focused on new technology to counter the 
German submarine threat, the solution was found in the trade protection policies o f  the 
18th century. The Admiralty’s reassignment o f destroyers was always minimal, and its 
‘resistance to mercantile convoy was obdurate. The anxiety and bafflement o f the men in 
charge was evident to everyone in the navy and in government...’26
However, Richmond’s contribution to strategy was not so much a strategic position, as it 
was a methodology for intellectual thought. ‘It is absolutely necessary to look at the war as 
a whole, and to avoid being parochial and keeping our eyes on the German Fleet only... The 
destruction o f the German Fleet is a means to an end and not an end in itself.’27 Richmond 
taught the complementarity o f  force, the relation o f force to diplomacy, the contingent 
nature o f war, the possible importance o f secondary or tertiary matters in strategy, that 
no single lesson o f naval science fits all, and the varieties o f ways that navies have been 
and can be used as instruments o f statecraft. He asked to what end would ships be used: 
the simple question at the heart o f naval strategy.
‘I have said that a navy is an instrument, designed for a purpose; and when that purpose is 
clearly known to the designer, it— the navy or the ship— will be useful... A tool is anything 
whatsoever which is used by an intelligent being for realising its object. The idea o f a desired 
end is inseparable from a tool.’28
Richmond was also convinced that a war strategy needed to be formulated against the 
background o f clearly defined objectives. He perceived that the objectives themselves might 
be in conflict, and that a sense o f balance must be imposed in selecting the theatre and timing 
o f conflict. From 1906, he championed the need for ‘adequate planning machinery’ within 
the Admiralty to determine and balance these ‘objectives’— a Naval War Staff. The concept he 
proposed was based upon, but not directly analogous to, the Army’s General Staff. The Naval 
War Staff would assist the Board o f Admiralty by providing it with war plans based on its own 
investigations. But this was a heresy that was seen to diminish the power o f Sea Lords’ authority. 
And it was on this issue that Richmond ‘fell out’ with Admiral Fisher. ‘Meanwhile nothing is 
being done. Fisher makes no move ... we have no one trained to think o f the problems o f war, 
the organisation required and the multitudinous details. 1 know only too well how ignorant 
we are, not only o f modern wars but even o f wars in History ... Fisher, clever as he is, has not 
made a study o f it, and in reality has no knowledge. He is a genius ... but his predecessors 
have not been, nor may his successors be geniuses.’29 Britain would, he felt, drift into war 
without considering ‘what we like to call abstract considerations’.30
In 1912 a Naval War Staff was finally created under the direction o f the then First Lord, Winston 
Churchill. However, it did not become an efficiently used or trusted part o f the Admiralty for 
many years. Richmond was in the Naval War Staff before and at the beginning o f World War 
One, but he felt that his ability to influence the war effort was circumscribed by senior officers 
jealously guarding their own power bases.
As a consequence o f this and other ‘frustrations’ Richmond starting selling the idea that the 
Royal Navy must ‘foster clear thought in the rising generation o f naval officers, rather than the 
blind acquiescence in authority.’31 ‘In peace, the dissemination o f ideas and their discussion 
cannot fail to do good to a service bent on improving itself from within.’32 He deplored ‘the 
system which denies officers opportunity to think or express their ideas. I hate this slavish 
habit o f naval officers and this false idea o f loyalty, which is generally not loyalty at all, but 
cowardice.’33
To this end he, and others, formed the idea for a ‘correspondence society for propagation o f 
sea-military knowledge’34 which developed into the Naval Society and eventually published the 
Naval Review.35 It was initially an instrument for reform through education that, during the war, 
developed into an instrument for the dissemination o f operational experience. From there it 
grew into an instrument for change.36 The Naval Review acted as an outlet, as a ‘percolator for 
concepts, the time for which is not ripe.’ Candour and freedom o f discussion were preserved 
through anonymous contributions— as protection for authors within a disciplined hierarchical 
system, and as an encouragement for offering criticism without offence— the precursor to 
the Chatham House Rule.37
what I hope to develop is the mental habit o f  reasoning things out, getting at the bottom o f
things, evolving principles and spreading interest in the higher side o f  our work.38
Conclusion
It is in the study, not o f the instrument, but o f  its use that we are deficient; in the study o f 
strategy, tactics and war, and war as a whole.39
While changing international geopolitics creates new policy challenges and new potential 
military adversaries, modern Western navies are generally still technology-based, manpower, 
and capital intensive institutions which cannot be transformed quickly, and whose basic 
employment requires a great deal o f time and effort to master. Naval strategy today has every 
tendency to appear, at its root, to be, as Richmond implied, the application o f professional 
‘rationalist’ experience to the solution o f technical problems. If the Royal Navy s various 
technical deficiencies in World War One were caused by excessive deference given to the 
vaunted expertise o f the ‘materialistic rationalist, then it seems that we may still have 
lessons to learn— for example: the British were under air attack in Falkland Sound in 1982 
before they discovered the terms on which the Sea W olf missile computers would accept 
a target, and ships had to burn before it was re-acknowledged that polyester clothing can 
melt onto the wearer. Andrew Gordon’s 28 blinding glimpses o f the obvious cut close to 
the bone’ and leave us much to ponder about. Our future may not necessarily be found in 
the informationalist’s cyberspace.
Notwithstanding, command o f the sea still needs to be secured, or maintained, before it can 
safely and effectively be exploited. In today s era o f Pax Americana,41 there is an emerging 
concept o f the need to shift the balance between what might be termed ‘control’ for 
‘exploitation’ , to the benefit o f the latter. Those concerned with force structure might well 
conclude that there is now relatively less need for forces intended primarily to win command 
o f the sea and relatively more need for those who intend to use it. This, indeed, appears to 
be a theme underlying the United States Navy’s strategic formulation, ‘ ... From the Sea’ . And 
it rises to Richmond’s contention, 100 years ago, that ‘Command o f the sea is only useful for 
the end it serves’ and that we may now have ‘a more complete command o f the sea ... than 
we have possessed in any previous maritime war, and yet we are making less o f its special 
advantage than we ever did.’42
Admiral Richmond sought to improve the preparation for war o f naval officers, and the 
organisation o f the naval service for dealing with war. He considered that the errors o f both 
World Wars were the direct result o f lack o f proper preparedness and war planning. He was 
convinced that the complacency producing such difficulties had its roots in a general lack o f 
appreciation for his view that ‘national policy war planning and Service preparedness’ were 
continuing and interacting requisites in the life o f a healthy state. The purpose o f Statesmen 
and Sea Power was to show how statesmen nurtured and used the elements o f sea power. The 
editor o f The Navy as an Instrument o f  Policy43 stated in his preface that Richmond wrote that 
book to help prevent what he greatly feared— ‘that what has happened before will repeat 
itself, and the nation, even if it survives— and the Empire, will again relapse into complacency. 
We may be there already.
It is on that note that much o f Richmond’s intellectually elegant and well-researched writings 
retain a good deal o f utility for modern naval planners— not the least being the need for 
planning itself. Firstly, much o f what he said still seems in itself sensible and relevant. Secondly,
and more importantly, the value o f Richmond lies not so much in what he said, but in the 
spirit o f the intellectual rigour and the experience o f historical lessons that he drew upon to 
say it. He raised permanent issues for the reality and application o f the naval instrument that 
furthers our understanding o f naval strategy today. And ‘his ideas are tools for thought, not 
substitutes for it’ .44
‘Previously the Royal Navy had produced men capable o f understanding, and sometimes o f 
gloriously fulfilling, the role that the state cast for them, but never before had it produced a 
man with the capacity to explain both the navy to the nation and the nation to the navy: to 
the mutual advantage o f each.’45
Commander McLennan undertook initial training at HMAS Creswell from  1972 to 1976 and 
initial sea training in HMAS Duchess and HMNZS Taranaki. In 1984 Commander McLennan 
completed his Principal Warfare Officer’s (PWO) course in the United Kingdom atHMS Dryad, 
before initially being the PWO and later Operations Officer in HMNZS Southland. He was 
posted to the ANZAC Ship Project in Canberra in late 1991 as the Operational Requirements 
Officer and the single point o f  contact fo r  the NATO Sea Sparrow program. In 2000 Commander 
McLennan joined the RAN S ta ff College as Directing S ta ff fo r  six months before being attached  
to the Australian Command and S ta ff College (ACSC) Project. While still based in Canberra, 
2004 saw him undertaking configuration options studies to align and upgrade the New Zealand 
and Australian ANZAC Ships.
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